ABSTRACT In this paper, we propose game-theoretic approaches to model the cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio environment with cognitive secondary users (SU) capable of energy harvesting. An evolutionary game model is considered in the first scenario, where distributed SUs are allowed to choose between two strategies, cooperate to sense the spectrum, or deny to be a free rider. The sensed data is sent to a fusion center (FC) to have a final decision about the existence of the primary user. In the second scenario, the Stackelberg game is applied to model the case when the FC participates as a leader in the game, with carefully designed incentives to SUs to encourage cooperation. Simulation results show the behavior of the two proposed game models and quantify the improvement due to the FC intervention in the Stackelberg game model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to proliferation in the wireless applications and the increased spectrum utilization, spectral efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE) are becoming key design objectives in the next generation wireless communication systems. In recent years, substantial research in wireless communications focused on new techniques for enhancing spectral efficiency. One of the ideas to improve the spectral efficiency is to apply cognitive radio (CR) technology. The concept of CR was introduced to enable unlicensed users, i.e., secondary users (SUs) to use the spectrum of the licensed primary user (PU) without causing harmful interference to the PUs [1] , [2] .
In a CR, SUs are required to perform spectrum sensing to identify the available frequency bands to be utilized for data transmission. For next generation mobile systems, spectrum sensing should be done on a wider band and with as low complexity as possible to enable accessing multiple bands [3] . In order to efficiently enhance the detection performance, cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), which provides spatial diversity gains has been proposed [4] . CSS techniques enable SUs to share their sensing information, or their local decisions, to reach a global decision, which is more accurate than the individual decisions Also, various approaches have been proposed for increasing the EE of wireless networks such as hardware solutions [5] , network planning [6] , and harvesting the energy from ambient sources, e.g., thermal, wind, solar, and radio frequency (RF) power [7] , [8] .
The concept of energy harvesting CR networks (EH-CRNs) has been proposed to address the SE and EE at the same time [9] , [10] . In EH-CRNs, SUs can harvest and store their required energy for spectrum sensing, date reporting, and data transmission from different ambient RF signals, in addition to their opportunistic access of the idle PU spectrum. In EH-CRNs, to achieve both the SE and the EE at the same time, two main constraints should be considered, i.e., the energy causality constraint and the collision constraint [10] . The energy causality constraint maintains a balance between the consumed energy and the harvested energy; i.e., the harvested energy should be greater than or equal to the consumed energy in sensing, reporting, and data transmission [10] . The collision constraint obligates the SU to properly protect the PU from interference by keeping the detection probability greater than a certain threshold.
In the most widely used EH-CRNs, a new time frame is proposed [11] . The EH-CRNs time frame is partitioned into three non-overlapping time slots for energy harvesting, spectrum sensing, and data transmission. Collision constraint requires longer sensing duration to achieve reliable spectrum sensing with less probability of false alarm, while less remaining time for energy harvesting and data transmission. In addition, longer duration for energy harvesting will result in more acquired energy for sensing and transmission with less time remaining for data transmission, which limits the SU's throughput. So, one of the main challenges for EH-CRNs is the tradeoff between the three processes, namely, energy harvesting, spectrum sensing, and data transmission. Several approaches aiming at optimizing SU's performance parameters, i.e., the sensing duration, energy harvesting duration, detection threshold, and etc., have been considered in literature. In the following we review different optimization problem formulations and discuss the suitability of game theory as a framework for optimization.
A. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
There have been substantial research efforts done in EH-CRNs that considered the harvest-sense-transmit tradeoff. In [12] - [14] , the system performance of cooperative EH-CRNs was studied. In [15] , the authors estimated an optimal sensing duration, which maximizes the average throughput of the system and the harvested energy. The study in [16] considered CSS in EH-CRN under limited energy and time resources. An optimization problem was formed to to calculate the optimum number of SUs and the optimal decision threshold for maximizing the total achievable throughput of the SUs with satisfying a specific collision probabilty. Yin et al. [17] considered SUs who depend solely on energy harvesting and working in slotted mode with ability to perform either sensing, harvesting or transmission in each minislot. The optimization problem to maximize the expected throughput of the SUs while protecting the PUs is considered with parameters including the save ratio, sensing duration, and threshold for data and decision oriented fusion. Another interesting model is proposed in [18] , where the PU is aware of the existence of the SU. Gao et al. [18] proposed a cooperation mechanism, where the SUs cooperate with each other and with multiple PUs. Both users can harvest energy from ambient radio signals and the SUs can work as relays to the PUs to accelerate the data transmission. An optimization problem is formulated to maximize throughput with constraints on the data transmission in a time slot. The solution to the problem is proposed through Cat Swarm Optimization (CSO) where the feasibility and superiority of this solution under the assumed scenario is verified.
In [19] , the case of heterogeneous SUs with different energy arrival rates and different sensing environment is considered. An optimal sensing policy, which employs the cooperating SUs is found to maximize the throughput of the SUs subject to the collision constraint and the energy causality constraint. The case of heterogeneous SUs is also considered in [8] , where stochastic energy arrival model is considered. The work in [8] develops the energy state evolution based on the stochastic energy arrival rate and uses it to develop an optimal sensing policy based on convex myopic optimization. This work was extended in [20] , to consider selecting a subset of the heterogeneous secondary users to optimize the achievable throughput is considered. The work in [21] , considered developing learning algorithms for SUs to determine the access policy and harvest energy in busy periods of the primary user. The learning algorithms developed in [21] considered both the cases of TDMA-based cooperative SUs and decentralized cooperative secondary users. Furthermore, the residual energy maximization has been studied in [22] in terms of the sensing duration, transmitting power, and collision constraint. In [23] , Pratibha et al. exploited the finite-horizon partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) to obtain the optimal policy of the SUs to maximize their throughput. More recently, Yao et al. [24] , proposed clustering the heterogeneous SUs according to their received power levels. The work in [24] aimed at maximizing the average throughput of the collaborative EH-CRN through optimizing its energy harvesting and sensing durations along with the local detection threshold and the number of cognitive nodes. To optimize its local detection threshold, a fictitious cognitive node (FCN) is proposed to have the same sensing performance as the sink node. The proposal of the FCN helps to convert the search for optimal local detection threshold to a search for the optimal received signal to noise ratio at the FCN. The set optimal parameters are obtained by applying the bisection method and a simplified line search method.
However, in the literature, most of the existing works in cooperative EH-CRNs assumes full cooperation, meaning that all SUs participate in sensing the spectrum and they are willing to send their measurements to the secondary base station to take a final decision about the spectrum occupancy [20] , [21] , [25] . However, cooperation of SUs has some overhead such as energy consumption, large decision delays, and sensing-and-reporting time. In addition, the SUs can be selfish as they may choose to cooperate or wait for the others to sense and then overhear their sensing results to save more time for data transmission. In this paper, we utilize the achievements in the game theory to formalize and analyze the behaviors and the actions of the SUs in the EH-CRNs.
Game theory is a powerful tool, which can capture and model the complex behavior of selfish and rational players, which has attracted a wide attention from wireless community [26] . Applying evolutionary game to model the sensing behavior of the SUs has been employed in [27] , where the model achieves better performance than having all SUs sensing the PU spectrum. In [28] , Ma et al. proposed periodic sleep-listen mechanism and punishment mechanism using evolutionary game to stimulate high SNR sensors to participate in spectrum sensing more than low SNR sensors. However, the work in [27] and [28] have not considered energy harvesting slots. In our work we consider evolutionary game that takes energy harvesting into consideration.
B. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we consider a joint maximization of the residual energy and the achievable throughput of the RF-based EH-CRNs. This is done by applying a game theoretic approach to model the CSS and energy harvesting in the RF-based EH-CRNs. We use two approaches, i.e., the evolutionary game approach and the Stackelberg game approach.
First, the evolutionary game model is used to obtain the best strategy for rational SUs, which decide between cooperative sensing or simply not to cooperate in the sensing process and wait for the other nodes to overhear the sensing results. On one hand, participation in cooperative sensing will result in low false alarm probability, while less time remains for energy harvesting and data transmission. On the other hand, acting selfish and refusing to cooperate, i.e., being free rider, saves the time for energy harvesting and data transmission. However, if many SUs decide not to cooperate then the reported values to the FC will not be enough for accurate detection and consequently the performance of the whole system (including the selfish nodes) will deteriorate. A rational SU has to optimize its decision using the powerful evolutionary game to take into account the behavior of the surrounding SUs along with its own power and performance requirements.
Key concepts of the proposed evolutionary game theoretic model are summarized as follows:
• The players of the game are the SUs, who will choose between two strategies, i.e., cooperate to sense the PU spectrum ''C'' or decide to be free rider ''F'' at different stages of the game. This decision has implications on the total energy harvested and the user throughput.
• Different utility functions are defined for both cooperating SUs and the free riders, which take into account both the SUs throughput and the SUs harvested energy in order to allow the joint maximization of the SUs throughput and the residual energy.
• We study the behavior dynamics for two cases, i.e., homogeneous SUs and heterogeneous SUs, and we derive the equilibrium, which leads to evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) using replicator dynamic equations.
• We design a distributed and updating algorithm which enables each SU selects strategy C and strategy Fİ with probabilities determined using the history of their own utilities. In addition to the evolutionary game model, energy harvesting opens the door for an incentive-based model, where the FC can direct power through either precision beamforming or allocate more occupied bands for energy harvesting to the selected nodes as a price for their cooperation in the sensing to enhance the detection probability required for the sensing operation. Key concepts of the proposed Stackelberg game theoretic model are summarized as follows:
• The FC is the Stackelberg leader, which collects sensing information from the cooperating SUs who are the Stackelberg followers.
• As a reward, the FC allocates a payment, in the form of directed energy to the selected SUs in return of their participation in sensing the PU spectrum.
• The strategy of the FC is to design the optimal allocated reward and to select a set of SUs in order to maximize its utility function, and the strategy of the SUs is to decide whether to participate or not in the CSS according to a comparison between the utility of cooperation and the utility of acting as a free rider.
• A heuristic algorithm is developed to obtain a set of selected SUs and an improved suboptimal value of the reward offered by the FC to the selected set. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides preliminaries and system model. Section III presents the evolutionary game formulation, and Section IV details the equilibrium analysis of the proposed evolutionary game model. The Stackelberg game formulation is presented in Sect. V. Section VI shows the simulation evaluation. We summarize our work and conclude the paper in Sect. VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that there exist K SUs and a single FC in EH-CRN who are allowed to access the PU licensed spectrum. We assume that the PU spectrum is divided into M subbands, and each SU can use any of the M subands when the PU is absent. At each time slot, SUs have to sense the M subands to classify each one of the subbands as either occupied or vacant. Due to the limited hardware for each SU, we assume that each SU can only perform one of the tasks, i.e. energy harvesting, sensing or transmitting at the same time. In the proposed model, the FC transfers RF energy and communicates with the SUs using different time slots. Regarding RF energy harvesting, two techniques exist, energy harvesting from a dedicated source and energy harvesting from ambient RF sources. In this paper, we assume that the K SUs are tuned to only harvest the RF energy broadcasted by the dedicated source, i.e., the FC in a certain band. The dedicated source RF energy harvesting can be optimized regarding the antenna design, directivity and the amount of energy dedicated to the users based on the distance. This is why we relied on this model in our paper. However, we can accommodate the assumption of harvesting the RF energy of the PU to our game models without loss of generality.
As shown in Fig. 1 , we assume that the K SUs are divided into two groups, G C and G F , where G C is the group of SUs who are willing to cooperate in sensing the PU spectrum and send the sensing reports to the FC, and G F is the group of SUs who decide to be free riders and overhear the sensing results broadcasted by the FC through a common signaling channel. By this way all SUs in the network have the same probability of false alarm P F .
Each member of G C follows the time frame structure shown in Fig. 2a , which is divided into three phases. In Phase I, the SUs harvest the ambient RF energy broadcasted by FC during the time T h1 = ραT , where T is the total frame time, and 0 ≤ ρ, α ≤ 1 is weighting factor. In Phase II, the members of G C sense the M subbands and report the sensing information to the FC during the time T s = (1 − ρ)T , in order to take the final decision through applying soft combining rules and then the FC announce sensing results through the common signaling channel. Then in Phase III, the SUs transmit their data over vacant channels during the time T t1 = ρ(1 − α)T . Meanwhile, the members of G F refuse to participate in cooperative spectrum sensing. Consequently, they can benefit from more time for energy harvesting and data transmission. The members of G F follow the time frame structure shown in Fig. 2b . They harvest the ambient RF energy broacasted by FC and transmit their data during time slots T h2 = αT and T t2 = (1 − α)T , respectively, using the vacant subands which are identified in the previous time slot. If no one joins group G C , the throughput of all SUs will be zero and the FC stops energy broadcasting.
B. COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING
In this paper, we assume the centralized cooperative scheme, in which all cooperating SUs send their full sensing measurements to the FC. Then the FC combines these sensing measurements from all cooperating SUs to decide whether the PU exists or not by utilizing energy detection and soft combining rules [29] . In this paper, for low overheads and simple design, the energy detection is chosen as the main sensing technique for the two proposed game models. All SUs perform spectrum sensing using energy detection and then report their average energy levels of the received signal to the FC.
The received signal y(t) at any SU's receiver from the detection has two binary hypotheses H 0 or H 1 , which denote the hypotheses of absence or the presence of PU signal, respectively. Then, y(t) can be written as:
where h k is the channel gain from the PU transmitter to the kth SU receiver, which we assume as slow flat fading, s(t) is the PU signal, which is assumed as an i.i.d random process with zero mean and variance σ 2 pu , and w(t) is the noise, which is considered to be cicular symmetric complex gaussian (CSCG) with zero mean and σ 2 w [30] . The average energy of the signal y k (t) at the kth SU can be expressed by [30] :
where N is the number of sensed samples. At the FC, average energy levels from all K c cooperating SU are used to calculate the overall average energy Y [30] :
Then the FC compare Y with a predetermined threshold Y th to decide the status of the PU whether it exist or not. The performance of spectrum sensing process is evaluated using two metrics: detection probability P d and false-alarm probability P f . P d is defined as the probability of correctly deciding the existence of the PU when the PU is present, while the P f represents the probability of deciding the existence of PU when the PU is absent. Since a target P d is usually predefined by the PU, the corresponding P f can be expressed by [29] :
where γ = σ pu /σ is the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the PU at the SU's receiver under
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C. THROUGHPUT AND RESIDUAL ENERGY OF A SECONDARY USER
We assume a time-slotted system with a frame duration T . For cooperative spectrum sensing, each time slot is divided into three phase: i) harvesting the dedicated RF energy provided by the FC, ii) local sensing of the PU's activity and reporting the sensing results to the FC, and iii) transmitting the data. For the cooperating SUs, we apply the frame structure in Fig. 2a , in which, we denote the time spent in energy harvesting by T h1 , and the sensing and reporting time by T s , then the data transmission duration is given by:
If we denote the PU absence probability by P H 0 , then the total throughput of the SU is given by: (7) where C 0 and C 1 are the data rate of the SU under H 0 and H 1 respectively. Based on the assumption that P d is required by the PU to be very close to 1 [1] , and C 1 < C 0 due to the interference from the PU to the SU, the second term in (7) is much smaller than the first term and can be neglected. Thus, (7) can be approximated as:
Similarly, the throughput for SUs who select not to cooperate and be free riders with the frame structure shown in Fig. 2b can be given by
In EH-CRN environment, the available residual energy of each SU should be observed before performing the cognitive functions, i.e., spectrum sensing and data transmission. With low residual energy, each SU may not be able to complete the spectrum sensing process, or not be able to succeed in the data transmission [31] . If a SU at frame t selects strategy ''C'' with the frame structure shown in Fig. 2a , the residual energy of such SU at the beginning of the next frame t +1 is given by
where E r (t) is the residual energy at the beginning of the frame t, E h1 (t) = QραT is the harvested energy, where Q is the energy arrival rate in the harvesting step. The consumed energy in the sensing process for time (1 − ρ)T is E s (t), and the consumed energy in data transmission for time
. If the SU selects strategy ''F'' with the frame structure shown in Fig. 2b in the frame t, the residual energy at the beginning of the next frame t + 1 will be
where E h2 (t) = QαT and E t2 (t) are the harvested energy and the consumed energy for data transmission for time (1 − α)T respectively.
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAME FORMULATION
In EH-CRNs, selfish SUs may opt to maximize their energy harvesting time and channel accessing time to have more residual energy and maximum data throughput. Such behavior of selfish SUs may lead to the case where no one senses the spectrum and gets high false alarm probability and low data throughput. On the other hand, if all SUs participate in sensing the spectrum, high detection probability will be gained, which leads to stable data throughput will be obtained at the cost of less time for energy harvesting and data transmission. The decision on cooperating or free riding is not clear. In natural cases, with intelligent autonomous SU units the decision may evolve over time through learning. Evolutionary game can be a very good fit to model the behavior of SUs in this case. Evolutionary game has been utilized modeling nodes' behaviors in communication networks [32] , such as cooperative sensing [27] , and image processing [33] . From this literature, evolutionary game has been shown as an effective tool to model the interactions among users in a network.
In this section, we first define the evolutionary game concept, and then explain our proposed evolutionary game model for spectrum sensing and energy harvesting in EH-CRNs. Replicator dynamic equations have been used to analyze our proposed game model.
A. EVOLUTIONARY GAME
In the evolutionary game, each player tries different strategies through observing their utilities and then approaches a stable equilibrium strategy. Such stable equilibrium strategy is known as evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [34] . Let us consider evolutionary game, in which U (s,ŝ) represents the utility of a player adopting strategy s against another player adopting strategyŝ. Then, a strategy s * is an ESS if and only
where the first condition clarifies that strategy s * is the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy and the second condition states the stability of strategy s * .
B. THE EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL
In this subsection, we propose to model the cooperation between the SUs in the EH-CRN as an evolutionary game, which describes the behavioral evolution of the actions taken by the SUs. In our evolutionary game model, as shown in Fig. 1 , we assume selfish but rational players. The SUs are the game players denoted by G = {g 1 , g 2 ....., g K }, and each player, i.e., SU can select one strategy from the strategy set A = [C, F], where C denotes strategy cooperate in sensing the PU's spectrum and F refers to the strategy of deciding not to cooperate, i.e., to be free rider, and to overhear the sensing results through common signaling channel. There is no cooperation in the game before taking decisions, i.e., each SU tries to maximize its own payoff. The players who select strategy C form a set, which are denoted by G C = {g C1 , g C2 ....., g CJ }, where each member of this set sense the M subbands of the PU, send their sensing information to the FC, and follow the time frame structure shown in Fig. 2a . For the members of G C , the most important parameter is the sensing time T s as the larger the T s , the less the harvested energy and the less the achieved throughput. However, as T s increases the detection probability improves and this also has a positive impact on the throughput.
Meanwhile, the selfish SUs who choose strategy F form a set G F = {g F1 , g F2 ....., g FK −J }, where each member of this set overhear the sensing results, and follow the frame structure shown in Fig. 2b . If no SU participates in sensing the PU spectrum, all of SUs may have a very low detection probability, i.e., very low throughput. Therefore, SUs have to try different strategies at each time slot and learn the best strategy from their strategic interactions. As a rational player would choose a strategy more often if that strategy brings a relatively higher payoff, we describe the process of updating the SUs strategy profile with replicator dynamics equations in Sec. IV-A.
C. UTILITY FUNCTIONS
The utility function of SU i ∈ G C who selects strategy ''C , i.e., participates in sensing the spectrum can be generally defined as:
where R s i represents the achievable throughput for SU i, and the first term f c (x) is the satisfaction function of the each SU with respect to the achievable throughput and it represents the gained reward of a SU from accessing the spectrum for a certain time. The second term E i hc is the harvested energy by the ith SU in the time T h = ραT , ∀ 0 < ρ, α < 1, and E i hc is given by:
where Q i is the energy arrival rate at the ith SU. In our model, for simplicity we choose to set f c (x) = x, i.e.,
where η is the parameter that translates SU's throughput profit to a corresponding energy profit to unify the units, and C G Ci is the data rate of the SU, i.e., player i ∈ G C at H 0 . All other terms in Eq. (14) have been previously described. Therefore, the utility function for SU i ∈ G C is:
For the free riders' set of SUs, i.e., G F = {g F1 , g F2 ....., g FK −J }, the utility function is given by
The SU s i ∈ G F will have more time for energy harvesting and data transmission, as it will not spend time in sensing the spectrum and will depend on the hearing the final result of the FC decision about the spectrum occupancy. Therefore, it is expected to have higher residual energy and throughput. If no SU selects strategy ''C'', i.e., all the SUs decide to wait for the others to sense, in that case, the total throughput of the network will be zero as no sensing information and the FC stops broadcasting the charging RF energy. Thus, the utility function of free rider will be
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED EVOLUTIONARY GAME
Section III defined the formulated evolutionary sensing game, the utilities of the different players and their strategies. In this section, we first introduce the replicator dynamic equations and then analyze the SUs' behavior dynamics and derive the stable strategies to reach equilibrium. In the analysis of equilibrium conditions, for simplicity and to get tractable replicator dynamic solution, we first study the case of large population of homogeneous SUs. In addition, we study the case of heterogeneous users and prove the ESS for two heterogeneous users case.
A. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS MODELING
In evolutionary game theory, replicator dynamics are used to characterize the population evolution. Population evolution refers to the change in the portion of players who adopt a certain strategy over time. Such portion may change with time as the players will try different strategies in every play round and learn from the interactions to improve their own payoff. Such a case will happen, when a set of rational players are uncertain of each others actions and utilities. As the time goes, the strategy with higher payoff continues and is used by a larger number of SUs. The SUs, i.e., players have to reach an equilibrium state when they stop learning. At that time, the average payoffs become constant and the SUs do not change their actions. For better clarification, let us first consider the case of a population of identical SUs with the same data rate C s i , energy arrival rate Q i , and received SNR γ i who adopt pure strategies j ∈ A. Let the g j (t) ≥ 0 be the number of the SUs who select the pure strategy j at time t, and g(t) = j∈A g j (t) ≥ 0 be the total number of SUs, i.e., the total population. We can define the percentage of population, which selects strategy j at time t as x j (t) where x j (t) = g j (t) g(t) and population state vector x(t) = x 1 (t), . . . , x |A| (t) . Using replicator dynamics, we can describe the evolution dynamics of x j (t) by the following differential equation [35] :
whereŪ (j, x −j ) is the average utility of the SUs who select pure strategy j while the other SUs select pure strategy other than j, x −j is the set of portions of the population who select VOLUME 6, 2018 strategies other than j.Ū (x) is the average utility of the whole population. From Eq. (18), we can deduce that if strategy j gives rise to a higher payoff than the average payoff of the whole population, the percentage of population x j (t) selecting strategy j will increase as strategy j will be selected more times in the future. Also, we can say that the probability of playing strategy j will increase with increment rateẋ j , which will be proportional to the difference betweenŪ (j, x −j ) andŪ (x). Next, we consider the case of different SUs with different data rates C s i , energy arrival rate Q i , and SNR γ i . We refer to the probability that a SU i selects pure strategy e ∈ A at time t by x e,i . The replicator dynamic equation of x e,i is given bẏ
whereŪ i (e, x −i ) is the average utility for SU i who selects strategy e while the other SUs select strategies other than e, andŪ i (x) is the average utility of the mixed strategies adopted by SU i.
B. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FOR HOMOGENEOUS SECONDARY USERS
In this subsection, we consider the case of symmetric, i.e. homogeneous SUs , i.e. same fading environments between the different SUs and the PU and the FC, respecitvely. Homogeneous SUs have identical data rates C s i = C, energy arrival rates Q i = Q, and SNRs γ i = γ . We can approximately assume constant P f for all SUs. In such a case, the utility functions in (15)- (16) , are given by:
, U C (j) and U F (j) are the utility functions of the members of G C and G F respectively, and j is the number of SUs who decided to select strategy ''C'', i.e., members of G C . The term j is added as a reward, which saves more time for energy harvesting and data transmission to the SUs who select to cooperate. This can be achieved by dividing the sensing time among cooperating SUs j so that each one will incur less sensing cost. We denote x as the probability that one SU joins the set G C . Consequently, the probability that a j out of K − 1 SUs join G C is :
Thus the average utility function for strategies C and F, receptively will be:
In the replicator dynamics equation, the average utility function of the whole population is given by:
Then Eq. (18) becomes:
At equilibrium, SUs stop learning, i.e., no SU will diverge from its own strategy, which means thatẋ * = 0. Consequently, from Eq. (26) the equilibrium of the game becomes x * = 0, or 1, or the solution ofŪ C −Ū F = 0. By using (23) and (24), we can get the following equation (see Appendix A)
Then, we can solve this equation to obtain the distribution x at equilibrium. In the following, we will show that the replicator dynamics converge to the above mentioned equilibrium values. Theorem 1: For any value of probability x ∈ (0, 1), the replicator dynamics in Eq. (18) converges to ESS. In particular, when ρ = 0 and = 0, the replicator dynamics converge to x * = 0; if ρ + = 1, then the replicator dynamics converge to x * = 1; if 0 < ρ + < 1, then replicator dynamic converge to the solution of Eq. (27) . Proof: (See Appendix B). We can summarize the equilibrium convergence states as follows: 
C. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FOR HETEROGENEOUS SECONDARY USERS
In the case of asymmetric SUs, all SUs have different utility functions due to different values of SNR γ i , data rate C i , and energy arrival rate Q i . It is complicated to prove the ESS of large number of different SUs. In the following, we will examine the game for only two players, i.e., two SUs. The payoff matrix of the two SUs is shown in Table 1 based on equations (15)- (17), where
Assume x 1 and x 2 to be the probability that SU s 1 and SU s 2 select strategy ''C'', i.e., join group G C , receptively. Thus, for SU s 1 the average utility function of selecting strategy 'C' can be given bȳ (29) and the average utility function is given bȳ
Therefore, the replicator dynamics of both SUs using Eq. (19) will beẋ
where
At equilibriumẋ 1 = 0 andẋ 2 = 0, thus by equating Eq. (31) and Eq. (33) by zero, the equilibrium points will be at (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), and (
). Based on [32] , equilibrium of replicator dynamic equation will be ESS, if it is asymptotically stable point in a dynamic system. The stability of the equilibrium point can be examined with the aid of the Jacobian matrix. First, the Jacobian matrix is formed by taking the partial derivatives of Eq. (31) and Eq. (33), then we can obtain
A local equilibrium point is asymptotically stable if the determinant of J (x 1 , X 2 ), i.e., det(J (x 1 , x 2 )) and the trace, i.e., tr(J (x 1 , x 2 )) satisfies that det(J (x 1 , x 2 )) > 0, and tr(J (x 1 , x 2 )) < 0. By substituting the above mentioned equilibrium point to the Jacobian matrix, we can obtain the following stability conditions:
there is one ESS (1, 0), and the strategies of SU s 1 and SU s 2 converges to (C, F).
there is one ESS
(0, 1), and the strategies of SUs s 1 and SU s 2 converges to (F, C).
there is one ESS (1, 1) , and the strategies of SUs s 1 and s 2 converges to (C, C).
there are two ESS (1, 0) and ESS (0,1) and the strategies of SUs s 1 and s 2 converges to (C, F) or (F, C) based on the initial adopted strategies.
D. THE EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM
In our proposed evolutionary game model, we assume that all SUs are selfish and rational, and they want to maximize their own utilities. At each time slot, to decide whether to cooperate or to be free rider each SU calculates its own utility and makes a decision based on the history of its own utility function. To select one strategy, each SU adopt the following steps:
Step 1: at the beginning, we assume that for all SUs there is set of strategies A = (C, F) and the probability that SU i selects certain strategy e ∈ A is x(e, i).
Step 2: At each time slot t, each SU i chooses the strategy e ∈ A with probability x i (e, t). Then, it calculates the utility function U i (e, t). The SUs who select strategy ''C'' sense the PU spectrum and send their measurements to the FC while the SUs who select strategy ''F'' harvest the RF energy and transmit their data over the sensed channels.
Step 3: Each SU i computes the average utilityŪ i (e) of strategy e and the average utilityŪ i of all strategies in the past time L slots. Thus,Ū i (e) andŪ i can be expressed as:Ū
where L ei denotes the number of times SU i adopts strategy e within the past L time slots.
Step 4: For the next time slot, each SU i calculates the probability of adopting strategy e by (36) where µ i is the step size of the adjustment. Equation (36) describes the dynamic process of choosing a strategy. The above mentioned steps are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Proposed EH-CRN Evolutionary Game Algorithm 1: Initialization
• for all SUs e ∈ A = [C, F] with x i (e, t) = x 0 .
• for all SUs select step size µ i 2: Each SU i chooses a strategy e with probability x i (e, t).
For each cooperating SU i ∈ G C
• Harvest RF energy for time αρT .
• Sense the PU spectrum for time (1 − ρ)T and send its measurements to the FC.
• Transmit its data during the time (1 − α)ρT . For each free riding SU i ∈ G F
• Harvest RF energy for time αT .
• Transmit its data during the time (1 − α)T . 3: Each SU i determines its utility function using Eq. (15) and Eq. (16). 4 
V. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION
One of the basic assumptions in the evolutionary game model considered in Sect. III, is that it assumes that the SUs are autonomous, i.e. they can decide whether to cooperate or not. If a large population reaches an evolutionary stable situation to be free riders, this will hurt the sensing probability and will also be unfair from the system point of view to the users that cooperate. In the case of centralized decision at the FC, another realistic model can be considered.
In the second game scenario we consider, the FC can play a central role in persuading SUs who opt for free riding to cooperate by providing an appropriate incentive. Thus, the FC achieves better detection performance than the evolutionary game model due to the increased number of cooperating SUs by allocating a certain reward for each cooperating SU. This interaction between the the secondary base station, (i.e., the FC) and the SUs in this case can be modeled as a buyer-seller game or leader-follower game. Stackelberg game is a very well-known game that models this leader follower behavior and has been widely used in wireless communications [36] - [38] .
A. STACKEBERG GAME Stackelberg game model is a strategic game, in which one player, i.e., the leader announces a certain strategy and then the other players, i.e., followers react to the leader's announced strategy with an action that holds its optimal utility. Given a leader and a follower, with their utility functions denoted by U 1 and U 2 , and strategy sets denoted by 1 and 2 respectively, whenever the leader declares strategy s l ∈ 1 , the follower will respond with a given strategy s f ∈ 2 . If the leader starts with strategy s 0 l , the follower's optimal strategy s * f (s 0 l ) can be given by
Therefore, the leader's optimal strategy s * l will be s * l = arg max
Finally, based on (37) and (38), the Stackelberg equilibrium locates an optimal strategy for the leader if the followers always respond by their Nash equilibrium strategies in the smaller sub-game.
In our Stackelberg game model as shown in Fig. 3 , the FC plays the role of the leader and each SU plays the role of the follower. The FC tries to motivate more SUs to share their sensing information in order to achieve improved detection performance, while Each SU tries to decide whether to cooperate or not. If the FC adopts as strategy that achieves its Nash equilibrium and the same applies to SUs as defined by (37) and (38) then the game will reach a Stackelberg equilibrium.
B. GAME FORMULATION
We formulate a Stackelberg game for the EH-CRN. The FC is the leader, and the SUs are followers. The FC tries to maximize its revenue, and minimize its cost. The main objective of the FC is to improve the detection probability. This has direct relation with the overall throughput of the cooperating SUs R T . Consequently, we can represent the FC's revenue by a t f (R T ), where a t is a weighting factor denoting the gain per unit of the average achievable throughput, and f (x) = x is the satisfaction function of the FC with respect to the average achievable data rate, while, the FC's cost is what is paid for SUs in return for their participation in sensing the spectrum, where the FC can direct power through beamforming to selected SUs as a price for their cooperation in the sensing. Thus, the difference of FC's revenue and cost is defined as its utility function, which is given by
where W represents the total reward, which will be allocated by the FC to the all cooperating SUs. For each SU i, we assume that the value of w i is proportional to the difference between how much power P C i will be allocated by the FC using a certain beamforming weighting factor to such SU in case of accepting cooperation and how much power P T is transmitted for all SUs in the normal case by the FC. K c is the set of cooperating SUs. The energy arrival rate at the receiver of SU i is given by [14] 
where 0 < η c < 1 is the energy conversion efficiency of the SU's energy harvester, and h i is the channel gain coefficient from the FC to the SU i. In case of the FC's reward the energy arrival rate will be
Consequently, the FC's reward will increase the energy arrival rate Q i at each cooperating SU i to be Q C i by allocating RF power through beamforming to each SU i. The strategy of the FC is to select a set of SUs to cooperate such that its utility function is maximized. From Eq. 39, the FC can make a tradeoff between the achieved throughput and the payment to the selected SUs by setting the value of a t . By assigning large value to a t , the FC cares more about the achievable throughput and consequently is more inclined towards incorporating more users and gives this a higher weight than the energy price paid. On the contrary, if small value assigned to a t , the FC is more concerned about its cost.
The cooperating SUs follow the same time frame for cooperating users as in the evolutionary game, which is explained in Fig. 2a where in the first (0, T h ) part the selected SUs harvest the allocated RF energy from the FC. In the remaining parts, the selected SUs sense the PU spectrum and report the measurements to the FC, then perform data transmission. Each SU aims to not only earn the payment that covers its spectrum sensing costs but also gain improved sensing performance due to the cooperative sensing of the spectrum and charges its battery. The utility function of each SU is given by
where U C and U F are the utility functions defined in (15) and (16) respectively. The utility function will be
Each SU will decide whether to cooperate or not, if U s i > 0, SU i will cooperate as the reward provided by the FC compensates the losses in energy due to cooperation. In the Stackelberg model, we assume that SUs inform FC of their initial decisions to cooperate and each SU is oblivious of other SUs decisions. Consequently, each SU can be under the threat of not being selected by the FC and as such it accepts the allocated reward, which will make just a difference between the ''cooperate'' and ''free riding'' utilities.
C. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM SOLUTION
Under the same assumption that the SUs are oblivious of each other decision and the details of the FC decision and are informed only of the game rules set by the FC, we propose another non-exhaustive practical model to approximate the optimal solution. We suggest a heuristic algorithm to find out the optimal reward, which will be allocated by the FC to the SUs and the optimal strategy for SUs. The algorithm is executed in a updating manner for the FC to reach the optimal reward. Then, each SU will reach its optimal strategy. The FC interacts with the SUs through the following steps: 1) At each iteration i the leader, i.e., the FC broadcasts the targeted false alarm probability P C f , required for the calculations of the utilities of the SUs, and the reward value w i provided for each SU. The reward announcement, starts with a basic reward w 0 corresponding to the original power boradcasted by FC in the evolutionary case. The announcement sent to all users. The already cooperating users will gladly accept and cooperate.
2) Each SU j considers the information (P C f , w i ), and its utility function U s j , Then it decides whether to participate in the sensing operation or not, and submits the vector v j = [γ j , d j , m j ] contains its SNR γ j , user ID d j , and binary value m j indicating its decision to the FC.
3) The FC arranges the received SNR information in descending manner:
• The FC tests the effect of each SU participation on its utility function one by one.
• The FC will continue to accept SUs until its utility function begins to decrease, then it will stop and form set G s contains all selected SUs.
• If the FC tested all received K ai SUs information and its utility function still increasing, the FC will save the current information vector
] along with the current announced reward w i and form set G s .
• Then, the FC will increase the announced reward w i+1 = w i + δ to motivate more SUs to participate in the sensing operation.
• The FC will test the effect of new received users one by one and, update the set G s , and follow the same stopping criteria. 4) The FC allocates the corresponding reward for each SU j ∈ G a in the form of RF energy to be harvested by each cooperating SU. 5) Each cooperating SU follow the frame structure shown in Fig. 2a.  6 ) The FC makes a final decision about the spectrum occupancy state and announces the results so that the SUs, who have been assigned vacant channel transmit their data. The algorithm procedures are summarized in Algorithm 2.
VI. SIMULATION EVALUATION A. SIMULATION SETUP
Simulation parameters are as follows. The frame time is T = 10 ms, the sampling frequency f s = 1 Mhz, the PU absence probability is P H 0 = 0.9, α = 0.5, the target P d = 0.95, the primary signal is a baseband BPSK modulated signal, and the noise is assumed to be a zero mean CSCG process and low received SNR with average value of -12 dB. In the following simulation all values of the energy arrival rate Q are given in mwatt. At the FC to estimate the PU's spectrum occupancy we use the cooperative soft combining rules explained in Sect. (II-B) . Simulation parameters are listed in Table 2 .
B. EVOLUTIONARY GAME SIMULATION RESULTS

1) HOMOGENEOUS SECONDARY USERS CASE
In this subsection, we study the performance of our formulated evolutionary game scheme of symmetric SUs as in Section (IV-B) , where the energy arrival rate Q = 10, = 0.12, and the bandwidth 2Mhz.
In Fig. 4 , we plot the cooperation probability with the number of iterations to show the dynamics evolution of the Algorithm 2 The Proposed Stackelberg Game Algorithm 1: Initialize:
• Initialize w i = w 0 , K s i = 0 number of selected SUs in iteration i, K s = 0 total number of selected SUs.
• U pre FC = 0, F=0 flag to indicate whether optimal U FC is reached, i=1 is the iteration counter.
• G s = φ set of selected SUs information.
• K t is the total number of SUs.
• K c i = 0, number of SUs who accept to cooperate. 2: Repeat 3: The FC announce the reward w i . 4 : 
End For: 9: if (F == 0) Then
Update the iteration number i = i + 1 11: Until: i = L reaches the specified number of iterations. 12: Return (W * C , K s ) cooperation probability x over time, where α = 0.5, ρ = 0.5, K = 4, = 0.12, and step size µ = 3. We can notice from Fig. 4 that the proposed evolutionary game scheme reaches steady state after less than 10 time iterations, approximately. Also, we can observe that either starting from high initial cooperation probability, (x 0 = 0.8 or 0.9) or low ones, (x 0 = 0.2 or 0.1), the proposed scheme reaches stability with lower cooperation probability and higher tendency to act as free rider to save more time for SU's own energy harvesting and data transmission, so that the SU gets higher payoff.
In Fig. 5 , we plot the average throughput per SU at equilibrium versus T s T = (1 − ρ), which represents the ratio between the time spent in spectrum sensing and the total frame time. The simulations are conducted for different number of users K = 2, 6, 10. We notice that a tradeoff exists between the achieved throughput and the spectrum sensing time ratio (1 − ρ) with optimal value around (1 − ρ) = 0.2 for different number of users. As the number of total SUs increases, the members of G C increases, which lead to high achievable throughput due to the reduced false alarm probability.
2) HETEROGENEOUS SECONDARY USERS CASE
In this subsection, we compare the performance of our formulated evolutionary game scheme with the case of full cooperation between SUs. The full cooperation case represents the situation, in which all SUs participate in the cooperative spectrum sensing, i.e, x = 1, and follow the time frame structure shown in Fig. 2a In the proposed time frame structure, the weighting parameter α controls the trade-off between the time durations for energy harvesting and data transmission. In the different simulations, we assume equal importance of energy harvesting and data transmission for a SU in EH-CRN, so we set α = 0.5. However, in order to assess the effect of α on the system throughput we compare the total achieved throughput of the five SUs with the four above mentioned settings with different values of the weighting parameter α in Fig. 6 . From  Fig. 6 , it is noticed that assigning small values for α leads to larger values of the total achievable throughput for the five SUs. However, the exact value of α will also depend on the ability to collect the needed energy in the harvesting duration, which in turns, depends on the energy arrival rate.
In Fig. 7 , we compare the total achieved throughput of the five SUs with the four above mentioned settings using α = 0.5. It is clear from the figure that using the proposed evolutionary game scheme has better performance than the full cooperation scheme, in which all SUs sense the spectrum at every time slot. The reason for this is that in the proposed evolutionary game scheme, SUs can alternate between cooperative spectrum sensing and being free rider, so on average waste less time in sensing and achieve higher throughput. This fact implies that it is not necessary to have all SUs participate in sensing the spectrum in every time slot to achieve a certain detection probability.
Next, we compare in Fig. 8 the total residual energy using the above mentioned four settings. We find that the residual energy of the proposed evolutionary game scheme is higher than the one that corresponds to the full cooperation scheme. This is due to the fact that in the proposed evolutionary game scheme, the SUs try different strategies at each time slot and on average get more time to harvest energy while adopting strategy ''F''.
We can conclude from the simulation results in Fig. 4 that in EH-CRN, SUs in sensing the PU spectrum will endure resource cost, such as time and energy, which is significant for CR user. From Figs. 4 , we can observe that either starting from high initial cooperation probability or low one, the proposed scheme reaches stability with lower cooperation probability as being free rider saves time and energy and the SU gets higher payoff. In the evolutionary model, any rational SU will not volunteer to sense the PU spectrum unless it receives an acceptable reward to compensate its cost. So selfish SUs are not willing to provide their resources such energy and time and it is a challenge to motivate them as VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 9. The total optimal utility of the fusion center.
their goal is to maximize their own payoff. In next subsection, we address this problem as an incentive framework based on Stackelberg
C. STACKELBERG GAME SIMULATION RESULTS
In this sub-section, we study the characteristics and the performance of our proposed Stackelberg game model. We asses the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of detection probability, false alarm probability, and the total residual energy. We also study the impact of adjustable factor a t on the utility function of the FC. We use the same simulation parameters as evolutionary game formulation for fare evaluation.
In Fig. 9 , we show the utility of the FC U FC over the number of iterations for three values of the weighting factor a t . The curve is concave with one maximum point at each value of a t as at each iteration the FC increases the offered reward, so SUs adjust their decisions based on the offered reward and more SUs will be willing to participate in the sensing operation, which lead to increasing probability of detection and increasing total average achievable throughput. As the offered reward Q grows up, the utility of the FC increases until the point, at which the gain of the FC from the cooperative sensing is less than its cost paid for SUs, so the curve turns and we obtain the optimal value of the offered reward. Also, it is noticed that by adjusting the value of weight factor a t , the FC trades off between the cooperative sensing gain and payment to the SUs. With low value assigned to a t , i.e., the FC cares more about the cost incurred, so that the maximum of the curve occurs at earlier iterations.
Next, we compare in Fig. 10 the relation between the detection probability and false alarm probability, i.e., the receiver operating characteristics (ROC), using the full cooperation model, the proposed evolutionary game model, and the proposed Stackelberg game model. For comparison, we set the number of total SUs K = 10, each with SNR γ i and energy arrival rate Q i drawn from uniformly distributed random values in the interval [−16, −10], and [2, 10] respectively. Fig. 10 shows that the best detection performance is achieved by the conventional full cooperation model, which requires all SU to share their sensing results. On the other hand, the proposed Stackelberg game model achieves highly improved detection performance compared with the evolutionary game model, as many SUs are motivated to cooperate due to the reward allocated by the FC. Also, it is clear that the detection performance of the Stackelberg game model comes closer to the full cooperation model performance by increasing the value of the weighting factor a t , which means that the FC will incur more cost.
In Fig. 11 , we compare the total residual energy using the three models with total number of SUs K = 10. For comparison, we use three groups, where for each group, the SNR γ i and energy arrival rate Q i are drawn from uniformly distributed random values in intervals (γ i , Q i ) = (−16, −13), (1, 5) , (−12, −9), (7, 10) , (−7, −5), (11, 13) . From the results, the residual energy of the proposed Stackelberg game exceeds that of the evolutionary game and the full cooperation model, due to the high reward offered from the FC, which highly increase the energy arrival rate at each cooperating SU.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the behavior of SUs with energy harvesting capabilities in cooperative spectrum sensing with selfish but rational SUs. We made use of the powerful game theory models to predict this behavior in two scenarios. In the first scenario, we considered an evolutionary game, in which SUs are the players and each SU can decide to cooperate or not without intervention from the FC. Simulation results show that the evolutionary game model has a better performance than the full cooperation model, in terms of total residual energy and the total throughput. However, the proposed evolutionary game model can reach steady state with low cooperation probability as selfish SUs are not willing to provide their resources such energy and time and it is a challenge to motivate them. To address this problem, we introduce a scenario, in which the FC can intervene in the cooperation process to allocate payments to the SUs in return of their participation in the sensing operation. The stackelberg game fits perfectly in modeling the interaction between the FC and the SUs. Simulation results show that the proposed CSS scheme with the stackelberg game model can achieve comparable detection performance to that of the evolutionary game model.
